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Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung

Ed. by Demmerling, Christoph / Esser, Andrea Marlen / Krüger, Hans-Peter / Menke, Christoph

CiteScore 2018: 0.06

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.139
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.234

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Volume 67, Issue 1


Dogmatischer Dogmatismusvorwurf

Eine Replik auf Stefan Müller-Doohm und Roman Yos

Fabian Freyenhagen
  • School of Philosophy and Art History, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Vereinigtes Königreich
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Published Online: 2019-03-08 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0003


Does theorising always presuppose a programme of justification? Does the Critical Theory of Adorno and Horkheimer do so? Do they claim it does? The answer should be a resounding ‘no’ to all three questions. In regard to the second and third question, I have sketched an argument to that effect in an earlier paper in this journal. In this paper, I offer a rejoinder to the critical reply offered by Stefan Müller-Doohm und Roman Yos on behalf of the Habermasian mainstream in Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This rejoinder depends on giving a negative answer also to the first question. In rejecting the Habermasian idea of a programme of justification, I stand accused of dogmatism and, consequently, decisionism (for how else than by an arbitrary decision can one choose among dogmas?). I show that this accusation itself betrays a certain dogmatism – insofar as it accepts that such a programme of justification is undeniably possible and required, without consideration of evidence or arguments to the contrary. Self-reflective and critical theorising about society can, indeed must, take other forms.

Keywords: programme of justification; Frankfurt School; Critical Theory; T. W. Adorno; Max Horkheimer; Jürgen Habermas; dogmatism


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About the article

Published Online: 2019-03-08

Published in Print: 2019-03-05

Citation Information: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Volume 67, Issue 1, Pages 42–58, ISSN (Online) 2192-1482, ISSN (Print) 0012-1045, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0003.

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