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Groups Complexity Cryptology

Managing Editor: Shpilrain, Vladimir / Weil, Pascal

Editorial Board Member: Blackburn, Simon R. / Conder, Marston / Dehornoy, Patrick / Eick, Bettina / Fine, Benjamin / Gilman, Robert / Grigoriev, Dima / Ko, Ki Hyoung / Kreuzer, Martin / Mikhalev, Alexander V. / Myasnikov, Alexei / Roman'kov, Vitalii / Rosenberger, Gerhard / Sapir, Mark / Schäge, Sven / Thomas, Rick / Tsaban, Boaz / Capell, Enric Ventura

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A nonlinear decomposition attack

Vitaliĭ Roman’kov
  • Omsk State University n.a. F. M. Dostoevskii, Omsk, Russian Federation
  • :
Published Online: 2016-10-23 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/gcc-2016-0017


This paper introduces a new type of attack, termed a nonlinear decomposition attack, against two known group-based key agreement protocols, namely, protocol based on extensions of (semi)groups by endomorphisms introduced by Kahrobaei, Shpilrain et al., and the noncommutative Diffie–Hellman protocol introduced by Ko, Lee et al. This attack works efficiently in the case when finitely generated nilpotent (more generally, polycyclic) groups are used as platforms. This attack is based on a deterministic algorithm that finds the secret shared key from the public data in both the protocols under consideration. Furthermore, we show that in this case one can break the schemes without solving the algorithmic problems on which the assumptions are based. The efficacy of the attack depends on the platform group, so it requires a more thorough analysis in each particular case.

Keywords: Group-based cryptography; key agreement protocol; (non)linear decomposition attack,polycyclic group; Diffie–Hellman protocol

MSC 2010: 20F10; 94A60

Received: 2016-07-07

Published Online: 2016-10-23

Published in Print: 2016-11-01

Funding Source: Russian Science Foundation

Award identifier / Grant number: 16-11-10002

This research was supported by Russian Science Foundation (project 16-11-10002).

Citation Information: Groups Complexity Cryptology. Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 197–207, ISSN (Online) 1869-6104, ISSN (Print) 1867-1144, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/gcc-2016-0017, October 2016

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