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Human Affairs

Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly

Editor-in-Chief: Višnovský, Emil

Ed. by Bianchi, Gabriel / Hrubec, Marek / Tartaglia, James

CiteScore 2018: 0.26

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.288
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.221

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Volume 17, Issue 1


Practices, Norms and Recognition

Titus Stahl
  • Institute of Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Grüneburgplatz 1 60629 Frankfurt a. M. Germany
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2007-06-20 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10023-007-0002-0

Practices, Norms and Recognition

The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.

Keywords: Rule-following; practice; recognition; collective attitude

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About the article

Published Online: 2007-06-20

Published in Print: 2007-06-01

Citation Information: Human Affairs, Volume 17, Issue 1, Pages 10–21, ISSN (Online) 1337-401X, ISSN (Print) 1210-3055, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10023-007-0002-0.

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