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it - Information Technology

Methods and Applications of Informatics and Information Technology

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In pursuit of a secure UI: The cycle of breaking and fixing Android’s UI

M. Sc. Davide Bove
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  • 9171 Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1, Martensstr. 3, D-91058 Erlangen, Germany
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/ M. Sc. Anatoli Kalysch
  • 9171 Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lehrstuhl für Informatik 1, Martensstr. 3, D-91058 Erlangen, Germany
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Published Online: 2019-03-15 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/itit-2018-0023

Abstract

Hijacking user clicks and touch gestures has become a common attack vector and offers a stealthy approach at escalating the privileges of a process without raising red flags among users or AV software. Exploits falling into this category are categorized as clickjacking attacks and have gained increased popularity on mobile devices, Android being the recent victim of a series of UI vulnerabilities.

Focusing on the Android OS this paper highlights previous and current UI-based attack vectors and finishes with an overview of security mechanisms, covering both system-wide as well as app-level protection measures.

Keywords: Android; Clickjacking; UI; Overlay; Security

ACM CCS: Security and privacy; Systems security; Operating systems security; Mobile platform security

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About the article

M. Sc. Davide Bove

M. Sc. Davide Bove is a Master’s graduate from Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU). He graduated in the field of Software Engineering and now focuses his studies on secure software, Android security and distributed networks.

M. Sc. Anatoli Kalysch

M. Sc. Anatoli Kalysch is a PhD student at Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU). His research interests include reverse engineering and program analysis, obfuscation techniques, and Android security. Anatoli Kalysch has a M. Sc. in computer science from FAU.


Received: 2018-08-23

Revised: 2019-01-24

Accepted: 2019-02-28

Published Online: 2019-03-15


Citation Information: it - Information Technology, ISSN (Online) 2196-7032, ISSN (Print) 1611-2776, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/itit-2018-0023.

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