Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis

Editor-in-Chief: Ewing, Bradley T. / Hoffman, Jim

1 Issue per year

CiteScore 2017: 0.32

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.160
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.622

See all formats and pricing
More options …

Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Systems: Error and Valuation

Shruti Rajagopalan
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Economics, Purchase College, State University of New York, Social Sciences Building, 735 Anderson Hill Road, Purchase, NY 10577, USA
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2017-04-28 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jbvela-2016-0019


This paper discusses valuation within the judicial processes by comparing the adversarial and inquisitorial systems of litigation. It evaluates adversarial and inquisitorial litigation on the legal systems’ ability to aid processes that lead to discovery of knowledge. It argues that much of the information required for accurate valuation must be discovered. While the adversarial method of litigation is essentially a competitive model of evidence production; the inquisitorial system comprises only the expert/principle searcher, and lacks a competitive discovery process. Therefore, as a system, adversarial litigation may be more conducive for error minimization in enforcing rules than inquisitorial litigation. On the question of business valuation of firms under Chapter 11, both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems are problematic, given that market competition leading to discovery of prices and valuation is impossible within the judicial system of valuation.


  • Adler, B. E 1993. “Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy.” Stanford Law Review 311–346.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Baird, D. G 1986. “The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations.” The Journal of Legal Studies 15 (1): 127–147.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Block, M. K, J. S Parker, O Vyborna, and L Dusek. 2000. “An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Procedural Regimes.” American Law and Economics Review 2 (1): 170–194.Google Scholar

  • Bonbright, J. C 1927. “The Problem of Judicial Valuation.” Columbia Law Review 27 (5): 493–522.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Bonbright, J. C 1937. “Valuation of Property”.Google Scholar

  • Bowers, C. P 1996. “Courts, Contracts, and the Appropriate Discount Rate: A Quick Fix for the Legal Lottery.” The University of Chicago Law Review 63 (3): 1099–1137.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Dewatripont, M, and J Tirole. 1999. “Advocates.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (1): 1–39.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Frank, J 1973. Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

  • Froeb, L. M, and B. H Kobayashi. 2001. “Evidence Production in Adversarial Vs. Inquisitorial Regimes.” Economics Letters 70 (2): 267–272.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Fuller, L. L 1978. “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.” Harvard Law Review 92 (2): 353–409.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Gross, S. R 1987. “The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation.” Michigan Law Review 85 (4): 734–757.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Hayek, F. A 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” The American Economic Review 35 (4): 519–530.Google Scholar

  • Hayek, F. A 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

  • Hayek, F. A 1968. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure. (Marcellus S. Snow Translation).” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5 (3): 9–23.Google Scholar

  • Hayek, F. A 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, v. 1: Rules and Order. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

  • LaPorta, R, F Lopez-de-Silane, A Shleifer, and R. W Vishny. 1996. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113–1155.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Landsman, S 1984. The Adversary System: A Description and Defense. Vol. 390 American Enterprise Institute Press.Google Scholar

  • Langbein, J. H 1985. “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure.” The University of Chicago Law Review 52 (4): 823–866.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Lind, E. A, J Thibaut, and L Walker. 1973. “Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings.” Michigan Law Review 71 (6): 1129–1144.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Milgrom, P, and J Roberts. 1986. “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties.” The RAND Journal of Economics 18–32.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Parisi, F 2002. “Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems Compared.” International Review of Law and Economics 22 (2): 193–216.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Posner, R. A 2014. “Economic Analysis of Law”.Google Scholar

  • Pound, R 1936. “Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.” Journal of the American Judicature Society 20: 178.Google Scholar

  • Rajagopalan, S 2014. “Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Paternalism and Filicide.” Journal of Indian Law and Society 5: 201–224. Monsoon.Google Scholar

  • Rajagopalan, S, and T. J Zywicki. 2016. “Bankruptcy Judge as a Central Planner.” In Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics., edited by Z Todd, and B Peter Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

  • Stearns, M. L, and T Zywicki. 2009. “Public choice concepts and applications in law”.Google Scholar

  • Stringham, E. P, and T. J Zywicki. 2011. “Hayekian Anarchism.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 78 (3): 290–301.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Tullock, G 1975. “On the Efficient Organization of Trials.” Kyklos 28 (4): 745–762.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Tullock, G 1980. Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure. Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

  • Tullock, G 2005a. “Optimal Procedure.” In The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock., edited by C. K Rowley, Vol. 9, 274–290. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar

  • Tullock, G 2005b. “The Case Against the Common Law.” In The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock., edited by C. K Rowley, Vol. 9, 399–455. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar

  • Tullock, G 2005c. “Rent-Seeking and the Law.” In The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock., edited by C. K Rowley, Vol. 5, 184–195. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar

  • Zywicki, T. J 2002. “Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis.” The Northwestern University Law Review 97: 1551.Google Scholar

  • Zywicki, T. J 2008. “Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock’s Critique.” Public Choice 135 (1–2): 35–53.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Zywicki, T. J, and A. B Sanders. 2007. “Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law.” Iowa Law Review 93: 559.Google Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2017-04-28

Citation Information: Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, Volume 12, Issue s1, 20160019, ISSN (Online) 1932-9156, ISSN (Print) 2194-5861, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jbvela-2016-0019.

Export Citation

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in