Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
Managing Editor: Magliveras, Spyros S. / Steinwandt, Rainer / Trung, Tran
Editorial Board Member: Blackburn, Simon R. / Blundo, Carlo / Burmester, Mike / Cramer, Ronald / Dawson, Ed / Gilman, Robert / Gonzalez Vasco, Maria Isabel / Grosek, Otokar / Helleseth, Tor / Kim, Kwangjo / Koblitz, Neal / Kurosawa, Kaoru / Lauter, Kristin / Lange, Tanja / Menezes, Alfred / Nguyen, Phong Q. / Pieprzyk, Josef / Rötteler, Martin / Safavi-Naini, Rei / Shparlinski, Igor E. / Stinson, Doug / Takagi, Tsuyoshi / Williams, Hugh C. / Yung, Moti
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CiteScore 2016: 0.74
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.313
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.749
Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2015: 0.24
Mean-set attack: cryptanalysis of Sibert et al. authentication protocol
- The City University of New York (LAGCC), Long Island City, NY, 11101, USA. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
- Department of Mathematics, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, 07030, USA. E-mail: email@example.com
We analyze the Sibert et al. group-based (Feige–Fiat–Shamir type) authentication protocol and show that the protocol is not computationally zero-knowledge. In addition, we provide experimental evidence that our approach is practical and can succeed even for groups with no efficiently computable length function such as braid groups. The novelty of this work is that we are not attacking the protocol by trying to solve an underlying complex algebraic problem, namely, the conjugacy search problem, but use a probabilistic approach, instead.
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