Abstract
We investigate security properties of the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld commutator key-establishment protocol [Math. Res. Lett. 6 (1999), 287–291] used with certain polycyclic groups described by Eick and Kahrobaei [http://arxiv.org/abs/math.GR/0411077]. We show that despite low success of the length based attack shown by Garber, Kahrobaei and Lam [J. Math. Crypt. 9 (2015), 33–43] the protocol can be broken by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm.
Funding source: NSA Mathematical Sciences Program
Award Identifier / Grant number: H98230-14-1-0128
© 2015 by De Gruyter
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