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Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.162
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 1.061

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
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Volume 102, Issue 1 (Jan 2011)

Issues

A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws

Martha I. Gibson
  • University of Wisconsin, Madison
Published Online: 2011-05-31 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2011.001

Abstract

In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our cognition, the truths we come to know are fully objective, expressing necessary relations between properties. Kant's distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ is shown to serve to properly restrict the scope of the necessity claims so that they do express necessary connections between properties.

Keywords.: phenomena; noumena; law of nature; necessity; Copernican revolution

About the article

Published Online: 2011-05-31

Published in Print: 2011-04-01



Citation Information: Kant-Studien, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2011.001. Export Citation

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