Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.163
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.224

Print + Online
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 102, Issue 2 (Jan 2011)

Issues

Kant's Non-Teleological Conception of Purposiveness

Thomas Teufel
Published Online: 2011-06-05 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2011.017

Abstract

In this paper I argue, first, that Kant's technical definition of purposiveness in § 10 of the third Critique is designed to abstract from all forward-looking considerations (teleological, intentional, normative, etc.) that accompany the conventional understanding of the term. Kant seeks to establish a strictly backward-looking, etiological conception of purposiveness in order to capture the causal link connecting artifacts with their concepts. I argue, second, that he succeeds. Kant's etiological conception of purposiveness neither collapses into mere mechanism, nor smuggles normative considerations in through the backdoor. I frame my discussion by critically engaging Hannah Ginsborg's reading of § 10 – a leading representative of normative interpretations of Kant's notion of purposiveness.

Keywords:: purposiveness; conceptual causality; normativity; Hannah Ginsborg

About the article

Published Online: 2011-06-05

Published in Print: 2011-06-01


Citation Information: Kant-Studien, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2011.017.

Export Citation

Citing Articles

Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.

[1]
Paolo Diego Bubbio
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2012, Volume 20, Number 5, Page 691

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in