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Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.


CiteScore 2018: 0.37

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.193
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 1.972

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
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Volume 103, Issue 4

Issues

Do Negative Judgments of Taste Have a priori Grounds in Kant?

Christian Helmut Wenzel,
Published Online: 2012-12-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2012-0034

Abstract: When contrasting something with its opposite, such as positive numbers with negative numbers, repulsion with attraction, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, Kant sometimes says the latter are not merely cases of negation or privation of the former, but that they have their own, independent grounds. But do negative judgments of taste really have a priori grounds? There are two kinds of negative judgments of taste: “This is not beautiful” and “This is ugly”. Can they be a priori judgments? Or are they always impure and without a priori basis? In this essay, I will argue that they can be pure a priori judgments. I will give detailed analyses of examples involving part-whole relationships, objects of art, and aesthetic ideas. In addition, detailed discussions of opposing interpretations will be offered.

: taste; ugly; evil

About the article

Published Online: 2012-12-01

Published in Print: 2012-12-01


Citation Information: , Volume 103, Issue 4, Pages 472–493, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2012-0034.

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[1]
Valerijs Vinogradovs
Sophia, 2016, Volume 55, Number 1, Page 101

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