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Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year

CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.163
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.224

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Volume 104, Issue 4


Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction

Colin Marshall
Published Online: 2013-12-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0028

Abstract: Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.

: self; appearances; things-in-themselves; idealism

About the article

Published Online: 2013-12-01

Published in Print: 2013-12-01

Citation Information: Kant-Studien, Volume 104, Issue 4, Pages 421–441, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0028.

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