Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.163
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.224

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 104, Issue 4 (Dec 2013)

Issues

Tetens und die Deduktion der Kategorien bei Kant

Alexei N. Krouglov
Published Online: 2013-12-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0030

Abstract: Quite a lot of parallels could be found between works by J. N. Tetens written in the 1770es and Kant’s deduction of the categories. Some of them were inspired by Kant’s Dissertation 1770, the others influenced Critique of Pure Reason. The philosophical position of Tetens in Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie and Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung is much closer to the one stated in Critique of Pure Reason than Kant’s own position in 1770 due to researching transcendent principles, considering the transcendent concepts as a priori concepts and setting the problem of their realization. However, the major step towards the transcendental deduction of the categories has been taken by Kant himself in terms of content and methodology.

: deduction of categories; realization of transcendent concepts

About the article

Published Online: 2013-12-01

Published in Print: 2013-12-01


Citation Information: Kant-Studien, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0030.

Export Citation

© De Gruyter. Copyright Clearance Center

Citing Articles

Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in