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Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.


CiteScore 2017: 0.31

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.262
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.596

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
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Volume 105, Issue 1

Issues

Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic

Lawrence Pasternack
Published Online: 2014-04-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2014-0003

Abstract: Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote” good inquiry; and, though rarely mentioned in the secondary literature, it offers Kant’s methodological alternative to the traditional epistemological goal of finding “a sufficient and yet at the same time general criterion of truth”.

: Opinion; Assent; Normative Epistemology; Certainty; General Applied Logic

About the article

Published Online: 2014-04-01

Published in Print: 2014-04-01


Citation Information: Kant-Studien, Volume 105, Issue 1, Pages 41–82, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2014-0003.

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