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Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year

CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.163
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Volume 105, Issue 3 (Sep 2014)


Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason

Markus Kohl
Published Online: 2014-09-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2014-0014


To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘practical freedom’ requires the absence of determination by, specifically, sensuous incentives. However, I argue that the defense of freedom presented in the Canon is abandoned by Kant in the Groundwork when he first develops his conception of the absolute purity of moral motivation.

: Transcendental Freedom; Practical Freedom; Critique of Pure Reason; Patchwork-reading

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Published Online: 2014-09-01

Published in Print: 2014-09-01

Citation Information: Kant-Studien, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2014-0014.

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