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Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.14

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.163
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.224

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
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Volume 106, Issue 4

Issues

Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion

Dennis Schulting
Published Online: 2015-12-20 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2015-0052

Abstract:

Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded (e.g. with reference to KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. (§ 13), which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.

Keywords:: Nonkonzeptualismus; Transzendentale Deduktion; figürliche Synthesis

About the article

Published Online: 2015-12-20

Published in Print: 2015-12-20


Citation Information: Kant-Studien, Volume 106, Issue 4, Pages 561–580, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2015-0052.

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