Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.


CiteScore 2018: 0.37

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.193
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 1.972

Online
ISSN
1613-1134
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 110, Issue 2

Issues

Radical Immanence of Thought and the Genesis of Consciousness: Salomon Maïmon

Florian Vermeiren
  • Corresponding author
  • Husserl-Archives: Centre for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, PhD Candidate KU Leuven Leuven, Belgium,
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2019-06-06 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2019-2001

Abstract

Salomon Maïmon argues that the formal determination of experience in Kant’s first Kritik insufficiently answers the question ‘quid juris?’. As an alternative to Kant’s theory, he develops a genetic transcendentalism in which experience is completely determined a priori. Discussing this genetic approach, I focus on how the spatiotemporal determinations of conscious experience are traced back to pure ideal relations. Relying on Leibniz and his theory of space and time, I explain how the extensive magnitudes of consciousness are founded in intensive magnitudes of what Maïmon calls ‘pure thought’. As the latter is the transcendental ground for both sensibility and the understanding, Maïmon’s theory contains a radical form of immanence, much like the philosophy of Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze.

Keywords: Intensive magnitude; genetic transcendentalism; radical immanence; differentials

About the article

Published Online: 2019-06-06

Published in Print: 2019-06-01


Citation Information: Kant-Studien, Volume 110, Issue 2, Pages 272–289, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2019-2001.

Export Citation

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in