Editor-in-Chief: Heidemann, Dietmar
Editorial Board: Allison, Henry E. / Ameriks, Karl / Brittan, Gordon G. / Düsing, Klaus / Dahlstrom, Daniel O. / Dyck, Corey W. / Engelhard, Kristina / Falkenburg, Brigitte / Ginsborg, Hannah / Gilmore-Grier, Michelle / Grundmann, Thomas / Guyer, Paul / Hanna, Robert / Kreimendahl, Lothar / Nuzzo, Angelica / Stern, Robert / Sturma, Dieter / Theis, Robert / Westphal, Kenneth R. / Willaschek, Marcus
CiteScore 2018: 0.43
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.115
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 1.690
This paper shows that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. Whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility. It is because we have direct control over our capacity to judge as well as the epistemic principles that govern belief-acquisition that we have indirect control over the beliefs we thereby acquire.
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