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Law and Development Review

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Economic Constitutions in the Developing World

Ngoc Son Bui
Published Online: 2019-06-20 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2019-0048

Abstract

A constitution is not purely a legal document. Neither is it only a political manifesto. It is also an economic charter which expresses a country’s economic hopes and aspirations, and regulates economic activities of constitutional stakeholders. This paper adumbrates a framework to understand the economic constitutions in the developing world. It explores the direct concept of an economic constitution, which refers to a constitution deriving from an overarching economic rationale, created or reformed through a process operating as a platform for different sectors of the society to deliberate economic questions, and consequently addressing national economic identity, principles, rights, and structural institutions in its substantive contents. Economic constitutions have two main functions: expressive and regulative. The tentative explanatory factors that may account for similarities and differences in the economic constitutions in developing countries include: the pre-existing economic conditions, the institutional setting, the national ideology, and the impact of globalization. The findings of this study offer systematic implications for the study of developing countries actively pursuing constitutional and economic development.

Keywords: economic constitution; constitutional economics; developing countries; constitutional development; economic development

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About the article

Published Online: 2019-06-20

Published in Print: 2019-10-25


Citation Information: Law and Development Review, Volume 12, Issue 3, Pages 669–690, ISSN (Online) 1943-3867, ISSN (Print) 2194-6523, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2019-0048.

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