Alston, William P. Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Ithaka/London: Cornell University Press, 2000.Google Scholar
Andersson, Jan S. How to Define ‘Performative’? Stockholm: Libertryck, 1975.Google Scholar
Austin, John L. How to do Things with Words, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.Google Scholar
Bach, Kent and Robert M. Harnish. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979.Google Scholar
Doerge, Friedrich Christoph. Illocutionary Acts. Tuebingen: University of Tuebingen, 2006a.; PhD thesis available online. http://tobias-lib.ub.unituebingen.de/volltexte/2006/2273/
Doerge, Friedrich Christoph. "Re-definition and Alston's ‘illocutionary acts.’" Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (2006b): 97-111.Google Scholar
Doerge, Friedrich Christoph. "Much ado about ‘performatives’" (manuscript in preparation).Google Scholar
Kemmerling, Andreas. "Gricy actions." In Paul Grice's Heritage, edited by Giovanna Cosenza et al., 69-95. Turnhout: Brepols, 2001.Google Scholar
Schiffer, Stephen. Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.Google Scholar
Searle, John R. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.Google Scholar
Searle, John R. "How performatives work." Linguistics and Philosophy 12, 535-558.Google Scholar
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics
Founded by Cap, Piotr
Editor-in-Chief: Chilton, Paul / Kopytowska, Monika
CiteScore 2018: 0.79
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.197
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.787
A scholarly confusion of tongues, or, is promising an illocutionary act?
Technical terms, I argued elsewhere, should not be re-defined without a profound reason; for such a re-definition furthers misunderstanding and is therefore undesirable. If my argument is on the right track, then we have reason to acknowledge the original definition of ‘illocutionary acts’ established by John L. Austin; any subsequent re-definition, unless it is specially justified somehow, must count as a terminological mistake. I use this argument, in order to proceed against what appears to me a highly problematic terminological situation, namely, the present existence of a double-digit number of different definitions of the term "illocutionary act." Against my argument, I met the objection that the co-existence of several different intensional definitions of ‘illocutionary acts’ eventually is not very problematic, given the alleged fact that the extension of the term is indisputable. In this paper, I argue that the objection fails, because its central premise is false: William P. Alston (2000), Bach & Harnish (1979) and John R. Searle (1969) have very different opinions as to whether, for instance, promising is an illocutionary act, even though promises are commonly supposed to be extremely obvious cases. Additionally, I consider the objection that the term "illocutionary act" is indispensable as a means of referring to those various things it is used for; I discard this objection by demonstrating that, and how, at least the accounts under consideration in this paper could easily do without the term.
Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.