Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …


International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Together with Cumpa, Javier

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel

2 Issues per year

CiteScore 2016: 0.12

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.111
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.530

See all formats and pricing
More options …

Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments

Jan Almäng
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 200, 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2014-01-07 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0001


It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive significance. So the veridicality of a certain perceptual experience, can imply the truth of certain propositions. Consequently, perceptions can have non-propositional content, but even so justify perceptual judgments which have a propositional structure.

Keywords: Perceptual content; propositional structure; perceptual judgments; perceptual justification; perceptual structure


  • Almäng, J. 2012. “Russellian Propositions and Properties.” Metaphysica 13:7–25.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Almäng, J. 2013. “The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception Revisited.” Dialectica 67:29–53.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Almäng, J. Forthcoming. “Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.” Husserl Studies.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Brewer, B. 2000. Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Candlish, S. 2007. The Russell/Bradley Dispute and Its Significance for Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Hampshire and New York: MacMillan.Google Scholar

  • Crane, T. 2003. “The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Q. Smith and A. Jokic, 33–56. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

  • Crane, T. 2009. “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” The Philosophical Quarterly 59:452–69.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Davidson, D. 1986. “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by E. Lepore, 307–19. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

  • Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, edited by J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Heck, R. G. 2000. “Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons.” Philosophical Review 109:483–423.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar

  • Husserl, E. 1901. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. As reprinted in husserliana vol. XIX/1 and XIX/2, ed. U. Panzer, 1975/1984). The Hague: Nijhoff.Google Scholar

  • Husserl, E. 1948. Erfahrung Und Urteil: Untersuchungen Zur Genealogie Der Logik. Edited by L.Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts.Google Scholar

  • Husserl, E. 1966. Analysen Zur Passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs Und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926. Edited by hrsg. M. Fleischer. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.Google Scholar

  • Johansson, I. 2000. “Determinables as Universals.” The Monist 83:101–21.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Johnson, W. E. 1921. Logic Part I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

  • Mulligan, K. 1997. “How Perception Fixes Reference.” In Sprache Und Denken [Language and Thought], edited by A. Burri, 121–38. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Google Scholar

  • Mulligan, K. 1999. “Perception, Predicates and Particulars.” In Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, edited by D. Fisette, 163–94. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar

  • Parsons, C. 2001. “Husserl and the Linguistic Turn.” In Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by J. Floyd and S. Shieh, 123–41. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Recanati, F. 2007. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Russell, B. 1903. Principles of Mathematics. London: George Allen and Unwin. 2nd edn, 1937.Google Scholar

  • Russell, B. 1910. “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood.” In Philosophical Essays, edited by B. Russell, 147–59. London: George Allen and Unwin. 2nd edn, 1966.Google Scholar

  • Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Simons, P. 1995. “Meaning and Language.” In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, edited by B. Smith and D. W. Smith, 106–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Smith, D. W. 1989. The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar

  • Smith, B., and K. Mulligan. 1982. “Pieces of a Theory.” In Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, edited by B. Smith, 15–109. München and Wien: Philosophia Verlag.Google Scholar

  • Soames, S. 2010. What Is Meaning? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

  • Thau, M. 2002. Consciousness and Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Twardowski, K. 1977. “On the Content and Object of Presentations.” A Psychological Investigation, translated and with an introduction by R. Grossmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Originally published in Germany in 1893).Google Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2014-01-07

Published in Print: 2014-04-01

Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 15, Issue 1, Pages 1–23, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0001.

Export Citation

©2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in