Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Together with Cumpa, Javier

Editorial Board Member: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel

2 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.12

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.111
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.530

Online
ISSN
1874-6373
See all formats and pricing
More options …

How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief

Mirosław Szatkowski
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, Theory of Science and Religious Studies, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2014-01-10 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0004

Abstract

Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is correct just in case it is true, which is frequently expressed in the metaphor that beliefs aim at truth. But, what does it mean to say that beliefs aim at truth? There are three most prominent approaches to this issue: purposive (or causal), teleological (or intentional), and normative. A comprehensive discussion of these approaches is the goal of our article. We also offer the hierarchy of languages and meta-languages, which gives a fragmentary account of the concept of God’s omniscience.

Keywords: correctness of belief; epistemic norm; God; Liar paradox; omniscience; ontological proof; positive properties; Tarski’s indefinability theorem; theistic belief; truth

References

  • Anderson, C. A. 1990. “Some Emendations of Gödel’s Ontolo-Gical Proof.” Faith and Philosophy 7:291–303.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

  • Aquinas, T. 1981. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Maryland: Christian Classics Westminster.Google Scholar

  • Bell, J. L., and M. Machover. 1974. A Course in Mathe-Matical Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar

  • Boghossian, P. A. 1989. “The Rule-Following Considerations.” Mind 98:157–84.Google Scholar

  • Boghossian, P. A. 2003. “The Normativity of Content.” Philosophical Issues 13:31–45.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Broome, J. 2000. “Normative Requirements.” In Normativity, edited by J. Dancy. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

  • Bykvist, K., and A. Hattiangadi. 2007. “Does Thought Imply Ought?” Analysis 67:277–85.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Creel, R. F. 1982. “Omniscience.” Process Studies 12:209–31.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Edmonds, K. A. 2007. Abandoning the Truth Aim – A Reevaluation of the Aim of Belief and the Goal of Cognition. Bachelor thesis, Williams College, Williamstown, MA.Google Scholar

  • Engel, P. 2001. “Is Truth a Norm?” In Interpreting Davidson, edited by P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar

  • Engel, P. 2002. Truth. Chesham: Acumen.Google Scholar

  • Engel, P. 2003. “Truth and the Aim of Belief.” In Laws and Models in Science, edited by D. Gilles. London: King’s College Publications.Google Scholar

  • Engel, P. 2007. “Belief and Normativity.” Disputatio II(23):179–203.Google Scholar

  • Gibbard, A. 2003. “Thoughts and Norms.” Philosophical Issues 13:83–98.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Gibbard, A. 2005. “Truth and Correct Belief.” Philosophical Issues 15:338–50.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Glüer, K., and A. Wikforss. 2009. “Against Content Normativity.” Mind 118:31–70.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Grim, P. 1983. “Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience.” American Philosophical Quarterly 20:265–76.Google Scholar

  • Grim, P. 1984. “There Is No Set of All Truths.” Analysis 44:206–08.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Grim, P. 1988. “A Truth, Omniscience and the Knower.” Philosophical Studies 54:9–41.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Grim, P. 1991. The Incomplete Universe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

  • Grim, P., and A. Plantinga. 1993. “Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Arguments: An Exchange.” Philosophical Studies 71:267–306.Google Scholar

  • Haack, S. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Humberstone, L. 1992. “Direction of Fit.” Mind 101:59–83.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Shah, N. 2003. “How Truth Governs Belief.” The Philosophical Review 112:447–82.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Shah, N., and J. D. Velleman. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review 114:497–534.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Steglich-Petersen, A. 2006. “No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56:499–516.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Szatkowski, M. 2005. “Semantic Analysis of Some Variants of Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs.” Studia Logica 79:317–55.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Szatkowski, M. 2007. “Contingent Modal Semantics for Some Variants of Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs.” Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 16:91–114.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Szatkowski, M. 2011. “Partly Free Semantics for Some Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs.” Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20:475–512.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Szatkowski, M. 2012. “Fully Free Semantics for Some Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs.” In Ontological Proofs Today, edited by M. Szatkowski. Frankfurt/Paris/Lancaster/New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag.Google Scholar

  • Tarski, A. 1935/36. “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Den Formalisierten Sprachen.” Studia Philosophica 1:261–405. Also, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, translated by J. H. Woodger, in Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics: Papers by Alfred Tarski 1923–1938, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.Google Scholar

  • Velleman, D. 2000. “On the Aim of Belief.” In The Possibility of Practical Reason, edited by D. Velleman, 244–81. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Wedgwood, R. 2002. “The Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Perspectives 16:267–97.Google Scholar

  • Wedgwood, R. 2007a. “The Normativity of the Intentional.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, edited by B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

  • Wedgwood, R. 2007b. “Normativism Defended.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

  • Williams, B. 1970. “Deciding To Believe.” In Problems of the Self, edited by B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Zangwill, N.1998. “Norms and Mind: Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism.” Philosophical Studies 91:173–203.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2014-01-10

Published in Print: 2014-04-01


It is a disputed question what normative properties are. See, on these issues, Broome (2000), Engel (2002), Wedgewood (2002), Zangwill (1998).

Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007, 280) distinguish between “S ought not to believe p” and “it is not the case that S ought to believe p”.

Of course, the theory m must be previously determined in a meta-language for the object-language .


Citation Information: Metaphysica, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0004.

Export Citation

©2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in