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International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver R. / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel

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Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Ingvar Johansson
Published Online: 2014-05-21 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0015


Contemporary defenders of non-disjunctivism take a representationalist philosophy of mind for granted; all kinds of conscious intentional states/acts/events are automatically regarded as being representations. The paper presents an alternative anti-representationalist view of the mind. It differs from other present-day anti-representationalisms in arguing that all conscious phenomena contains a this-worldly something called “from-pole”, and it denies that an intentional content and the corresponding intentional object always are distinct entities. The view is set in contrast to both a transcendental ego tradition and a no from-pole tradition. Hereby, the paper defends the common sense-like view that we are persons who directly perceive, act in, and talk about things in a common world.

Keywords: disjunctivism; representationalism; intentional content; consciousness


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About the article

Published Online: 2014-05-21

Published in Print: 2014-11-28

Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 15, Issue 2, Pages 239–265, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2014-0015.

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