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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Together with Cumpa, Javier

Editorial Board Member: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel

2 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.12

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.111
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.530

Online
ISSN
1874-6373
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van Inwagen’s Argument for the Existence of Fictional Characters. An Evaluation and Critique

Dolf Rami
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Göttingen, Humboldtallee 19, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
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Published Online: 2015-05-02 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0005

Abstract

This essay will be concerned with an evaluation, modification and critique of van Inwagen’s famous argument for the existence of fictional characters. Firstly, a reconstruction of the original argument will be provided and three different challenges for the original version of the argument will be pointed out. Secondly, there will be a more detailed investigation of the weaknesses pointed out. It will be shown how they can be cleared, and a modified, less problematic, alternative version of the argument will be proposed. Thirdly and finally, three different possible options that an irrealist concerning fictional characters has to respond to our modified argument will be evaluated. The view will be defended that the irrealist can make use of a substitutional interpretation of specific fictional generalisations based on a negative free logic to undermine the modified argument in a plausible way.

Keywords: fictional characters; quantification; existential import; free logic

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About the article

Published Online: 2015-05-02

Published in Print: 2015-05-25


Citation Information: Metaphysica, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2015-0005.

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