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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Together with Cumpa, Javier

Editorial Board Member: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel

2 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.12

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.111
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.530

Online
ISSN
1874-6373
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Super-Truth & Direct Reference

John Gabriel
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, Washington University in Saint Louis, Campus Box 1073, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO 63130, USA
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Published Online: 2016-03-15 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0002

Abstract

Proponents of supervaluationism claim super-truth, i. e., truth on every admissible precisification, is identical to truth or, at least, is a suitable truth proxy. I object that super-truth is neither identical to nor a suitable proxy for truth. I argue that to claim a statement is super-true is simply to maintain that a certain counterfactual holds, and that a claim is true, counterfactually, is no reason to treat it as true. I further argue that, with super-truth undermined, Roy Sorensen’s objection that supervaluationism cannot accommodate vague directly referential terms presents supervaluationism’s defenders with a significant challenge.

Keywords: supervaluationism; direct reference; super-truth; vagueness; counterfactuals

References

  • Evans, G. 1978. “Can There Be Vague Objects.” Analysis 38:208.Google Scholar

  • Fine, K. 1997. “Vagueness, Truth and Logic.” In Vagueness: A Reader, edited by R. Keefe and P. Smith. Cambridge, 119–50. MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

  • Fodor, J., and E. Lepore. 1996. “What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated and It Cannot Be Supervalued Either.” Journal of Philosophy 93:516–35.Google Scholar

  • Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

  • Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar

  • Lewis, D. 1988. “Vague Identity: Evan’s Misunderstood.” Analysis 48:128–30.Google Scholar

  • Sorensen, R. 2000. “Direct Reference and Vague Identity.” Philosophical Topics 28:177–94.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Weatherson, B. 2003. “Many Many Problems.” Philosophical Quarterly 53:481–501.Google Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2016-03-15

Published in Print: 2016-04-01


Citation Information: Metaphysica, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0002.

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