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International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

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Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity

Jeremy Fantl
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, AB T2N 2Z5, Canada
  • Email:
Published Online: 2016-03-08 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0007


Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining premise – that it is impossible for an object to begin to exist uncaused – seems more old fashioned. I argue that Shepherd can do without her old-fashioned premise and that she provides the materials for arguing that her remaining premises demonstrate a stronger anti-Humeanism than is maintained even by the contemporary representatives of those views, even though she may have to concede more to Humeanism than she would like.

Keywords: Mary Shepherd; Hume; causation; bundle view; causal view of properties; causal necessity; scientific essentialism


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About the article

Published Online: 2016-03-08

Published in Print: 2016-04-01

Citation Information: Metaphysica, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0007. Export Citation

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