International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics
Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin
Together with Cumpa, Javier
Editorial Board Member: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel
The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe
1Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
This research was carried out during my time as a Research Fellow on the Durham Emergence Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation(Grant ID: 40485).
Citation Information: Metaphysica. Volume 17, Issue 2, Pages 163–176, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0012, September 2016
- Published Online:
This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.