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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

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Abstract Entities in a Presentist World

Aldo Filomeno
  • Corresponding author
  • Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Circuito Mario de la Cueva s/n, Ciudad Universitaria, C.P. 04510, Coyoacán, CDMX, Mexico
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Published Online: 2016-09-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0014

Abstract

How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world.

Keywords: presentism; abstract objects; unrestricted quantification; ontological pluralism

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About the article

Published Online: 2016-09-01

Published in Print: 2016-09-01



Citation Information: Metaphysica, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0014. Export Citation

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