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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver R. / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel


CiteScore 2018: 0.29

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.257
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.369

Online
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1874-6373
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Intentionality, Privilege and World Pluralism: Reply to Beillard

Timothy J. Nulty
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Philosophy, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, 285 Old Westport Road, North Dartmouth, MA 02747-2300, USA
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Published Online: 2017-03-25 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0009

Abstract

I respond to Julian Beillard’s (2016) critique of my arguments (2009, 2015) for a plurality of worlds. My initial arguments deployed the notions of relevant similarity and primitive triangulation found in the later writings of Donald Davidson. More specifically, I address Beillard’s claims that my use of intentionality to develop further Davidson’s concept of primitive triangulation is incoherent and leads to empirically absurd results. I argue that Beillard’s two main arguments—the causal objection and the coherence objection – fail due to a limited and erroneous understanding of the forms of intentionality relevant to primitive triangulation. I argue Beillard unjustifiably privileges one form of intentionality as the standard for what counts as real in a given world. Some of Beillard’s claims might in fact commit him to the world pluralism I advocate.

Keywords: Davidson; triangulation; intentionality; pluralism; worlds; realism

References

  • Beillard, J. 2010. “Triangles, Schemes and Worlds: Reply to Nulty.” Metaphysica 11:181–189.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Beillard, J. 2016. “Worlds, Triangles and Bolts: Reply to Nulty.” Metaphysica 17.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Davidson, D. 1974. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Davidson 1984, pp. 183–198.

  • Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Davidson, D. 1992. “The Second Person.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:255–267. Reprinted in Davidson 2001, pp. 107–122.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Gibson, J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, MA.Google Scholar

  • Nulty, T. 2009. “Conceptual Schemes Revisited: Davidsonian Metaphysical Pluralism.” Metaphysica 10:123–124.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Nulty, T. 2015. “Worlds, Not Worldviews: Reply to Beillard.” Metaphysica 16:179–188.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Searle, J.R. 1983. Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Searle, J.R. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2017-03-25

Published in Print: 2017-09-26


Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 18, Issue 2, Pages 237–251, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0009.

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