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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver R. / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Stoecker, Ralf / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel


CiteScore 2018: 0.29

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.257
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.369

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1874-6373
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Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?

John Robert Mahlan
  • Corresponding author
  • The American University in Cairo, AUC New Cairo, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud Hall (HUSS), Room 1073, Cairo, Egypt 11835
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Published Online: 2017-12-09 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0002

Abstract

Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are immanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted.

Keywords: metaphysics; ontology; universals; location; instantiation

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About the article

Published Online: 2017-12-09

Published in Print: 2018-03-26


Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 19, Issue 1, Pages 39–55, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0002.

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