Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver R. / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel


CiteScore 2018: 0.29

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.257
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.369

Online
ISSN
1874-6373
See all formats and pricing
More options …

Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism

Stefan Reining
  • Corresponding author
  • Institute of Philosophy, Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45117 Essen, Germany
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2017-12-16 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0003

Abstract

The central aim of this paper is to argue that the main motivation for endorsing colour relativism – namely, the occurrence of so-called standard variation phenomena – constitutes, in the end, a problem for the view itself which is not significantly smaller than the problem these phenomena constitute for most of the view’s competitors. Section 1 provides a brief characterization of the relativist position in question. In Section 2, I provide a prima facie case for colour relativism in the light of the occurrence of standard variation phenomena, and I argue that a certain version of the view can be defended against certain objections that have been raised against colour relativism. Section 3 provides an argument for the central claim of this paper, that is, an argument to the conclusion that standard variation phenomena do, in the end, not at all favour colour relativism over its main competitors. Finally, in Section 4, I suggest and tentatively defend a hitherto neglected account of the meaning of colour terms that accommodates the phenomena in question.

Keywords: colour; relativism; standard variation; absolutism

References

  • Block, N. 1999. “Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 26:39–70.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • BonJour, L. 2005. “In Defense of the A Priori.” In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by M. Steup and E. Sosa. Malden, MA: Wiley.Google Scholar

  • Broackes, J. 1997. “Could We Take Lime, Purple, Orange, and Teal as Unique Hues?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:183–184.Google Scholar

  • Byrne, D., and D.R. Hilbert. 2003. “Authors’ Response.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:52–59.Google Scholar

  • Campbell, J. 1993. “A Simple View of Colour.” In Reality, Representation, and Projection, edited by J. Haldane and C. Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Churchland, P. 2007. “On the Reality (And Diversity) of Objective Colors: How Color-Qualia Space Is a Map of Reflectance-Profile Space.” Philosophy of Science 74:119–149.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Cohen, J. 2004. “Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto.” The Philosophical Review 113:451–506.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Cohen, J. 2009. The Red and the Real. An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Cohen, J. 2012. “Redder and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye.” Analytic Philosophy 53:313–326.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Cohen, J., C.L. Hardin, and B.P. McLaughlin. 2006. “True Colours.” Analysis 66:335–340.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Cohen, J., C.L. Hardin, and B.P. McLaughlin. 2007. “The Truth about ‘The Truth about True Blue’.” Analysis 67:162–166.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Gert, J. 2008. “What Colors Could Not Be: An Argument for Color Primitivism.” The Journal of Philosophy 105:128–155.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Glüer, K. 2007. “Colors without Circles?” Erkenntnis 66:107–131.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Hardin, C.L. 1988. Color for Philosophers. Unweaving the Rainbow. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar

  • Jackson, F. 1996. “The Primary Quality View of Color.” Philosophical Perspectives 10:199–219.Google Scholar

  • Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

  • Kay, P., B. Berlin, L. Maffi, et al. 2009. The World Color Survey. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.Google Scholar

  • Kölbel, M. 2009. “The Evidence for Relativism.” Synthese 166:375–395.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • MacFarlane, J. 2009. “Nonindexical Contextualism.” Synthese 166:231–250.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Malkoc, G., P. Kay, and M.A. Webster. 2005. “Variations in Normal Color Vision. IV. Binary Hues and Hue Scaling.” Journal of the Optical Society of America A 22:2154–2168.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • McLaughlin, B.P. 2003a. “Colour, Consciousness, and Colour Consciousness.” In Consciousness. New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Q. Smith and A. Jokic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

  • McLaughlin, B.P. 2003b. “The Place of Colour in Nature.” In Colour Perception. Mind and the Physical World, edited by R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

  • Neitz, J., and G.H. Jacobs. 1986. “Polymorphism of the Long-Wavelength Cone in Normal Human Colour Vision.” Nature 323:623–625.CrossrefPubMedGoogle Scholar

  • Neitz, J., M. Neitz, and G.H. Jacobs. 1993. “More than Three Different Cone Pigments among People with Normal Color Vision.” Vision Research 33:117–122.CrossrefPubMedGoogle Scholar

  • Neitz, M., and J. Neitz. 1998. “Molecular Genetics and the Biological Basis of Color Vision.” In Color Vision. Perspectives from Different Disciplines, edited by W.G.K. Backhaus, R. Kliegl and J.S. Werner. Berlin: De Gruyter.Google Scholar

  • Ocelák, R. 2015. “The Myth of Unique Hues.” Topoi 34:513–522.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content. Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford :Clarendon Press.Google Scholar

  • Peacocke, C. 1984. “Colour Concepts and Colour Experience.” Synthese 58:365–381.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Hazell, Watson and Viney.Google Scholar

  • Saunders, B.A.C., and J. Van Brakel. 1997. “Are There Non-Trivial Constraints on Colour Categorization?.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:167–179.Google Scholar

  • Spackman, J. 2002. “Color, Relativism, and Realism.” Philosophical Studies 108:249–287.Google Scholar

  • Tye, M. 2006a. “The Puzzle of True Blue.” Analysis 66:173–178.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Tye, M. 2006b. “The Truth about True Blue.” Analysis 66:340–344.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Tye, M. 2012. “Cohen on Color Relationism.” Analytic Philosophy 53:297–305.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2017-12-16

Published in Print: 2018-03-26


Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 19, Issue 1, Pages 57–86, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0003.

Export Citation

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in