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International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

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Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths

Nils Kürbis
Published Online: 2018-02-16 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0014


Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be inconsistent. By themselves, however, they are not. The other purpose of this note is to propose some plausible further principles that, when added to the four metaphysical theses, entail a contradiction.

Keywords: negation; falsity; truth; truth makers; correspondence


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About the article

Published Online: 2018-02-16

Published in Print: 2018-08-28

Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 19, Issue 2, Pages 225–250, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0014.

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