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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter February 5, 2019

Propensities and Possibilities

  • D. H. Mellor EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.

References

Lewis, D. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Philosophical Papers Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Mcgrath, M. and D. Frank. 2018. “Propositions.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta, ed. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/.Search in Google Scholar

Mellor, D. H. 1999. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Mellor, D. H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Stenwall, R. J. Persson, and N.-E. Sahlin. 2018. “A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and the Propensity Theorist.” Metaphysica 19 (2):219–224.10.1515/mp-2018-0012Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2019-02-05
Published in Print: 2019-04-24

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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