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Metaphysica

International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics

Managing Editor: Koridze, Georg

Ed. by Hüntelmann, Rafael / Meixner, Uwe / Tegtmeier, Erwin

Editorial Board: Addis, Laird / Davies, Brian / Hochberg, Herbert / Johansson, Ingvar / Kanzian, Christian / Klima, Gyula / Koons, Robert C / Künne, Wolfgang / Löffler, Winfried / Mulligan, Kevin / Nef, Frederic / Oaklander, Nathan / Oderberg, David / Orilia, Francesco / Plantinga, Alvin / Potrc, Matjaz / Rapp, Christof / Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth / Schantz, Richard / Scholz, Oliver R. / Seibt, Johanna / Simons, Peter / Smith, Barry / Strobach, Niko / Trettin, Käthe / Wachter, Daniel


CiteScore 2018: 0.29

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.257
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.369

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1874-6373
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More Work for Hybrid Persistence

Jacek Brzozowski
  • Corresponding author
  • School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Private Bag X01, Scottsville, 3209, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
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Published Online: 2019-02-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2004

Abstract

Recently I defended a hybrid view of persistence whereby simple objects endure while composite objects are stage related. I argued that it deserves further investigation given the explanatory work it does with regard to two problems raised in the literature on the metaphysics of the persistence of objects. In this paper I look at two further problems that have been raised—one from natural explanation, the other from time travel. I show how the hybrid view is able to deal with these problems. In doing so I further build the case that the hybrid view is a serious contender in the persistence debate based on the explanatory work it can do.

Keywords: simples; composite objects; persistence; time travel; natural explanations

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About the article

Published Online: 2019-02-12

Published in Print: 2019-04-24


Citation Information: Metaphysica, Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 103–115, ISSN (Online) 1874-6373, ISSN (Print) 1437-2053, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2004.

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