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Cooperative Authoritarians and Regime Stability

Clay Robert Fuller
  • Corresponding author
  • Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Gambrell Hall, Columbia, SC 29208-0001, USA
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Published Online: 2017-04-06 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2017-0009

Abstract

This article assumes that the post-cold war unipolar global power structure marked the beginnings of a two-level game of national survival involving an international process of “othering,” where the winning democracies and their leaders (the “West”) view many non-democracies and their leaders as threats that they must convert, subjugate, or eradicate. Using new data on special economic zones (SEZs), I find that geographically restricting economic liberalization and reducing competition from opposition parties increases authoritarian stability and durability in this new environment.

Keywords: special economic zones; authoritarianism; regime stability

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About the article

Published Online: 2017-04-06

Published in Print: 2017-06-27


Citation Information: New Global Studies, ISSN (Online) 1940-0004, ISSN (Print) 2194-6566, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2017-0009.

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