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Open Political Science

Editor-in-Chief: de Mucci, Raffaele

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2543-8042
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The Visegrád Group – A Rising Star Post-Brexit? Changing Distribution of Power in the European Council

Ralf Thomas Göllner
Published Online: 2017-07-05 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2017-0001

Abstract

The portmanteau Brexit describes the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) which will cause a shift of power in the European institutions. The departure of one of the largest EU members will affect the voting power of member countries in the European Council significantly. This Council is the central hub of political decision making in the EU, defining the overall political direction and priorities and setting the policy agenda for the entirety of the EU. Using the Banzhaf power index, we have measured the voting power before and after the Brexit and analyzed the increasing power of the members of the Visegrád Group compared to other European states. We have found that there is growth in the voting power of all Visegrád states, with Poland experiencing the biggest increase. However, the extent by which the Visegrád Group will profit from this statistically growing power depends on the coordination of their voting behavior in the future.

Keywords: Visegrád countries; European Council; voting power; coalition building; Brexit

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About the article

Received: 2017-01-30

Accepted: 2017-03-27

Published Online: 2017-07-05


Citation Information: Open Political Science, Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 1–6, ISSN (Online) 2543-8042, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2017-0001.

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© 2017. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. BY-NC-ND 4.0

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