Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Open Political Science

Editor-in-Chief: de Mucci, Raffaele

Open Access
Online
ISSN
2543-8042
See all formats and pricing
Online
Open Access
*Prices in US$ apply to orders placed in the Americas only. Prices in GBP apply to orders placed in Great Britain only. Prices in € represent the retail prices valid in Germany (unless otherwise indicated). Prices are subject to change without notice. Prices do not include postage and handling if applicable. RRP: Recommended Retail Price.
More options …

The Shia armed groups and the future of Iraq

Kardo Rached / Ahmed Bali
Published Online: 2018-07-18 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2018-0002

Open Access

Download PDF

Abstract

The rising and acceleration of the Shia armed group in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon require a deep understanding of the root of the multi-dimensional conflicts in the Middle East. An appropriate and sufficient approach to the research about these militias would be from a viewpoint of an internal conflict rather than an external conflict. The legitimization of the existence of the majority of these militias, if not all of them, is the fight and the struggle against an entity which is the Sunni sect, that would assimilate them rather than integrating them peacefully. In this article, we try to identify the impact of the Shia militias in Iraq on the formation of the future of this country. We maintain that these armed groups will be a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors, and they will worsen and deepen the sectarian division in the Middle East. We assess these different groups from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly of violence; Ariel Ahram’s model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias; and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.

This article offers supplementary material which is provided at the end of the article.

Keywords: Iraq; Iran; Shia armed groups; Sectarian division; ISIS; New Middle East and Religious violence

References

  • Aziz, J. (2016, August 18). What are Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units doing in Beirut? Lebanon pulse. The Almonitor. Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/lebanon-host-secret-meeting-iraq-pmus-westerndiplomats.html.Google Scholar

  • Balcells, L. (2012). Book review of proxy warriors: The rise and fall of state-sponsored militias - By Ariel Ahram. Democracy and Security, 8, 406-414. doi:CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Bali, A. O (2016), Political Communication in Kurdistan, Germany, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.Google Scholar

  • Bali, A. O., & Abdullah, K. H. (2017). The consequence of an economic boom on the perception of democracy, government performance and public service: Iraqi Kurdistan as a case study. International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 11(3), 221-234.Google Scholar

  • Carey, S. C., Mitchell, N. J., & Lowe, W. (2013). States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence. Journal of Peace Research, 50, 249-258. doi:CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Brancati, D. (2004). Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq? The Washington Quarterly, 27, 7 - 21. doi.org/10.1162/016366004773097687CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Cockburn, P. (2005, February 9). Cricket but no chess in Sistani’s vision for democratic Iraq. The Independent News of the World. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/cricket-but-no-chess-in-sistanis-vision-fordemocratic-iraq-1529714.html.Google Scholar

  • Cole, J. (2014, August 15). Top 10 mistakes of former Iraq PM Nouri al-Maliki (that ruined his country). Juan Cole’s Blog. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2014/08/mistakes-Maliki-country.html.Google Scholar

  • Lutterbeck, D. (2004). Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries. Cooperation and Conflict, 39, 46-47Google Scholar

  • Ekman, J. (2009). Political participation and regime stability: A framework for analyzing hybrid regimes. International Political Science Review, 30, 7-31. doi:CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Massoud, A. (2015). About hybrid countries in the Arab world. The Arab Weekly Newspaper. Retrieved from http://www.alarab.co.uk/article/Opinion/53177/%D8%B9%D9%86-Google Scholar

  • Evans, G. (2003, August 26). Only self-rule will bring stability to Iraq. The Crisis Group. Op-ed, Middle East & North Africa. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/only-self-rulewill-bring-stability-iraqGoogle Scholar

  • Golkar, S. (2015). Captive Society: The Basij militia and social control in Iran. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

  • Gordon, M., & Schmitt, E. (2014, September 10). Saudi Arabia will grant U.S. request for anti-ISIS training program. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-isis.html?_r=1Google Scholar

  • Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2010). Comparative Government and Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-99.Google Scholar

  • Hamilton, S. (2011). Outsourcing U.S. defense: National security implications - UPDATED: Industry insights. The National Defense. Retrieved from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/January/Pages/OutsourcingUSDefenseNationalSecurityImplications.aspx.Google Scholar

  • Hawn, J. (2013). Intro to global security: Defining mercenaries and militias. Retrieved from http://introglobalsecurity.blogspot.com/2013/02/defining-mercenaries-and-militias.html.Google Scholar

  • Khedery, A. (2014, July 3). Why we stuck with Maliki -- and lost Iraq. The Washington Post. Opinions. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html?utm_term=.c59a1a63d94fGoogle Scholar

  • Middle East Eye Staff. (2015, June 21) Militias ‘greater threat’ to Iraq’s unity than Islamic State: Petraeus. News, The Middle East Eye. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/militias-greater-threat-iraqs-unity-islamic-state-petraeus-1595509838Google Scholar

  • Rawabet Research and Strategic Studies Center. (2016). Popular crowd forces in Iraq (Al-Hashd al-shaabi) origin and future - survey. Releases, The Rawabet. http://rawabetcenter.com/en/?cat=3Google Scholar

  • Tran, M., & Roberts, D. (2014). Obama to lay out plan to ‘destroy’ Isis threat as Kerry arrives in Baghdad. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/10/john-kerry-baghdad-obama-isis-strategyGoogle Scholar

  • Tures, J. (2014, October 7). How we enabled ISIS by disarming Iraqi militias. Huffington Post. The Blog. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-tures/how-we-enabled-isis-by-di_b_5947796.html.Google Scholar

About the article

Received: 2018-04-26

Accepted: 2018-05-21

Published Online: 2018-07-18

Citation Information: Open Political Science, Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 46–57, ISSN (Online) 2543-8042, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2018-0002.

Export Citation

© 2018 Kardo Rached, published by Sciendo. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. BY-NC-ND 4.0

Supplementary Article Materials

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in