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Open Theology

Editor-in-Chief: Taliaferro, Charles

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What Does Theology Have to Do With Religion?

Dual-process Accounts, Cognitive Science of Religion and a Curious Blind Spot in Contemporary Theorizing

Olli-Pekka Vainio
Published Online: 2016-01-16 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2016-0008

Abstract

In the cognitive science of religion (CSR), it is often claimed that religion is a product of information processing system that is nonconscious, automatic and irrational. This view rests on a theoretical basis provided by dual-process accounts (DPA) of reasoning. In this paper, I will provide some examples how DPAs are employed in contemporary theorizing in CSR and point out some problems, which reveal an oversight that may impede the progress of the scientific study of religion. The topic touches on the wider debate on evolutionary debunking arguments but my point concerns CSR theorizing and how it might not be able to understand religion properly.

Keywords: Cognitive science of religion; dual process accounts; debunking

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About the article


Received: 2015-08-28

Accepted: 2015-10-26

Published Online: 2016-01-16


Citation Information: Open Theology, Volume 2, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 2300-6579, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2016-0008.

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©2016 Olli-Pekka Vainio. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. BY-NC-ND 3.0

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