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Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Caruso, Raul

Ed. by Bove, Vincenzo / Kibris, Arzu / Sekeris, Petros

CiteScore 2017: 0.54

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.304
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.540

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Volume 16, Issue 1


Volume 17 (2011)

Volume 4 (1996)

Volume 3 (1995)

Volume 2 (1994)

Volume 1 (1993)

Opportunity Costs and the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game (With Comments by Lloyd Jeff Dumas)

Solomon W Polachek / Jun Xiang
Published Online: 2010-06-09 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1188

This paper summarizes conclusions reached in Polachek and Xiang (International Organization, 2010). It shows how gains from trade decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information game. The result reaffirms how opportunity costs explain the inverse trade-conflict relationship found in current empirical literature on the subject. The ensuing discussion puts the result in the broader context of peacekeeping.

Keywords: incomplete information game; interdependence; gains from trade; conflict; peace-keeping

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Published Online: 2010-06-09

Citation Information: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Volume 16, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1554-8597, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1188.

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©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

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