Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Caruso, Raul

Ed. by Böhmelt, Tobias / Bove, Vincenzo / Kibris, Arzu / Sekeris, Petros

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.182
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.224
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2015: 0.256

See all formats and pricing

Select Volume and Issue


Volume 23 (2017)

Volume 17 (2011)

Volume 4 (1996)

Volume 3 (1995)

Volume 2 (1994)

Volume 1 (1993)

30,00 € / $42.00 / £23.00

Get Access to Full Text

Wartime Violence and Post-Conflict Political Mobilization in Mozambique

1 / Raul Caruso2

1Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, USA, Center on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, Tel.: +1 617 642 5842; fax +1 617849 8109

2Institute for Economic Policy, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan

Citation Information: . Volume 18, Issue 3, ISSN (Online) 1554-8597, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2012-0013, December 2012

Publication History

Published Online:


Mozambique’s post-conflict development has recently focused on the promise of biofuels production, and the Government of Mozambique has accordingly made hundreds of agricultural concessions to foreign and domestic corporations since 2006. In response, local groups have sought community land grants to protect livelihoods. We seek to understand whether the magnitude and recentness of violent events during Mozambique’s 16-year civil war determined the success of communities’ efforts to secure lands. We hypothesize that violence weakens the ability of communities to protect their traditional land uses from concessions by lobbying for community land grants. This hypothesis - dubbed the “weak institutions hypothesis” - is contrasted with the idea that violence galvanizes political participation. We test the hypothesis using GIS-generated data at the district level on recognized community landholdings and civil war events. Controlling for factors such as market access, road distance to grain warehouses, and spatial auto-correlation, we find that more intense violence is possibly (but not significantly) associated with more land grants, and that districts experiencing more recent violence are actually more likely to lobby successfully for land grants - lending support to the idea that violence boosts community use of riskpooling institutions.

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.