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Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Caruso, Raul

Ed. by Bove, Vincenzo / Kibris, Arzu / Sekeris, Petros

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2017: 0.54

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.304
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.540

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1554-8597
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Volume 22, Issue 4

Issues

Volume 17 (2011)

Volume 4 (1996)

Volume 3 (1995)

Volume 2 (1994)

Volume 1 (1993)

Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War

Ideology and Beliefs, Indivisibles and Time Preferences

Thomas Gries / Claus-Jochen Haake
Published Online: 2016-10-21 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042

Abstract

In this note we focus on the particularly long duration of civil armed conflicts. We argue that if conflict parties have extreme ideological beliefs or follow an “irrevocable religious or ideological truth,” there could be three elements in the preference order that may imply a long duration of the conflict. More precise, preference orders of conflict parties are multidimensional. If (1) one dimension is a set of rules that defines an irrevocable ideology and or religious beliefs, and (2) is a necessary element in the preference order, and (3) due to elements of their beliefs – time preference is low, the conflict may have a long duration. For insurgents motivated by such strong beliefs it is essential that their set of rules is established, not when.

Keywords: civil conflict; conflict duration; ideology and beliefs; time preference

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About the article

Published Online: 2016-10-21

Published in Print: 2016-12-01


Citation Information: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Volume 22, Issue 4, Pages 377–384, ISSN (Online) 1554-8597, ISSN (Print) 1079-2457, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042.

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