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Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik

Editor-in-Chief: Haucap, Justus

Ed. by Arnold, Lutz / Corneo, Giacomo / Grimm, Veronika / Horn, Karen / Schneider, Friedrich / Wagner, Franz / Winter, Joachim


CiteScore 2018: 0.37

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.225
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.798

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1468-2516
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Volume 16, Issue 3

Issues

Die Rolle von Verhaltensökonomik und experimenteller Forschung in Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Politikberatung

Joachim Weimann
Published Online: 2015-09-09 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2015-0017

Zusammenfassung

Verhaltensökonomische Ansätze und experimentelle Methoden sind in den vergangenen dreißig Jahren zu festen Bestandteilen der ökonomischen Methodik geworden. Joachim Weimann zeichnet nach, wie es zu dieser Erweiterung gekommen ist und wie sich die neuen Konzepte und Methoden mit dem paretianischen Programm des „Rational choice“ vertragen. Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse schlägt er eine Integration aller Methoden in ein Konzept evidenzbasierter Politikberatung vor. In diesem Konzept ordnen die Dimensionen „Kausalität“, „externe Validität“ und „Breite der Anwendbarkeit“ die Methoden. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Verhaltensökonomik und die experimentelle Methode hervorragend geeignet sind, komplementär zur neoklassischen Theorie und zur empirischen Forschung eingesetzt zu werden.

JEL-Klassifikation: A11; A12; B10; B13; C10; C18; C90; C91; C93

Schlüsselwörter: Verhaltensökonomie; experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; evidenzbasierte Politikberatung; neoklassische Wirtschaftstheorie; psychologische Forschung; Dogmengeschichte.

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About the article

Published Online: 2015-09-09

Published in Print: 2015-10-01


Citation Information: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Volume 16, Issue 3, Pages 231–252, ISSN (Online) 1468-2516, ISSN (Print) 1465-6493, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2015-0017.

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