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Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik

Editor-in-Chief: Haucap, Justus

Ed. by Arnold, Lutz / Corneo, Giacomo / Grimm, Veronika / Horn, Karen / Schneider, Friedrich / Wagner, Franz / Winter, Joachim


CiteScore 2018: 0.37

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.225
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.798

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1468-2516
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Volume 16, Issue 4

Issues

Ökonomische Herausforderungen des Klimawandels

Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Corresponding author
  • Universität Regensburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universitätsstraße 31, D-93040 Regensburg
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  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
/ Peter Heindl
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Forschungsbereich Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomik, Umweltmanagement, L7 1, 68161 Mannheim
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  • Other articles by this author:
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Published Online: 2015-11-27 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2015-0027

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Überblicksartikel befassen sich Wolfgang Buchholz und Peter Heindl mit zentralen Themen einer „Ökonomik des Klimawandels“. Sie skizzieren zunächst ein idealtypisches Szenario, innerhalb dessen ökonomische Ansätze zur Bewältigung des Klimaproblems zu erörtern sind. Anschließend betrachten sie verschiedene ökonomische Probleme, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Klimawandel und dessen Bewältigung auftreten. Dazu gehören die Bewertung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen, die Auswahl geeigneter klimapolitischer Instrumente und die Ermöglichung von Koordination und Kooperation in der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter. Abschließend reißen sie noch einige offene Fragen und ungelöste Probleme an.

JEL-Klassifikation: Q54; H41

Schlüsselwörter: Klimaökonomik; Diskontierung; Instrumentenwahl; Klimapolitik

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About the article

Published Online: 2015-11-27

Published in Print: 2015-12-01


Citation Information: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Volume 16, Issue 4, Pages 324–350, ISSN (Online) 1468-2516, ISSN (Print) 1465-6493, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2015-0027.

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