ACEMOGLU, D. (1999). Changes in unemployment and wage inequality: an alternative theory and some evidence. American Economic Review. 89. Pp.1259-1278.
AMINE, S., LAGES DOS SANTOS, P. (2010). Technological Choices and Unemployment Benefits in a Matching Model with Heterogenous Workers. Journal ofEconomics. 101 (1). Pp. 1-19.
AMINE, S., LAGES DOS SANTOS, P. (2011). The Influence of Labour Market Institutions on Job Complexity. Research in Economics.65 (3). Pp. 209-220.
ALBRECHT, J.W., GAUTIER, P.A., VROMAN, S.B. (2003). Matching with Multiple Applications. Economics Letters. 78 (1). Pp. 67-70.
ALBRECHT, J.W., VROMAN, S.B. (2002). Matching model with endogenous skill requirements. International Economic Review. 43. Pp.283-305.
GAUTIER, P.A. (1999). Unemployment and search externalities in a model with heterogeneous jobs and heterogeneous workers. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. 99-075/3.
GAUTIER, P.A., TEULINGS, C. (2004). The right man for the job. Review ofEconomic Studies.71, Pp.553-580.
MARIMON, R., ZILIBOTTI, F. (1999). Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: reconsidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal. 109. Pp. 266-291.
MC KENNA, C. (1985). Uncertainty and the labour market, Harvester Press.
MORTENSEN, D.T., PISSARIDES, C. (1999). Unemployment response to ‘‘skill biased’’ shocks: the role of labour market policy. Economic Journal. 109. Pp. 242-265.
NICKELL, S. (2004). Poverty and worklessness in Britain. Economic Journal. 114. Pp.1-25.
PETRONGOLO, B., PISSARIDES, C. (2001).Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function. Journal of Economic Literature. 39. Pp. 390-431.
PISSARIDES, C. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Review of Economic Perspectives
Národohospodárský obzor; The Journal of Masaryk University
4 Issues per year
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.143
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.273
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2015: 0.121
Job Differentiation vs. Unemployment
We use a matching model in which the horizontal job differentiation results from the rationale response of firms to the state of the labor market. We show that a decrease in the labor market tightness gives firms an incentive to raise the differentiation degree of jobs. Comparative statics suggests that an increase in unemployment benefits and in the minimum wage improves productivity of skilled workers by making jobs more differentiated, and leads to a raise in unemployment rate.