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Review of Economic Perspectives

Národohospodárský obzor; The Journal of Masaryk University

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.50

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.262
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.516

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1804-1663
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Volume 14, Issue 2

Issues

From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders

Joshua J. Miller
Published Online: 2014-07-10 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006

Abstract

This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-price. I find auction revenue is greatly increased, by as much as 22 percent, under the first-price auction. The results are supported by a within county difference-in-difference model specification and are robust when restricting the sample across various specifications

Keywords: Property Tax Delinquency; Tax Lien Sales; Auction Type; Auction Design

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About the article

Published Online: 2014-07-10

Published in Print: 2014-06-01


Citation Information: Review of Economic Perspectives, Volume 14, Issue 2, Pages 105–127, ISSN (Online) 1804-1663, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006.

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© by Joshua J. Miller. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. BY-NC-ND 3.0

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