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A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science

Ed. by Bodnár, István / Corcilius, Klaus / Gregoric, Pavel / Ierodiakonou, Katerina

Editorial Board: Barnes, Jonathan / Bobzien, Susanne / Burnyeat, Myles / Cooper, John M. / Dimas, Panos / Grgic, Filip / Karasmanis, Vassilis / Laks, André / Lautner, Péter / Lennox, James / Mourelatos, Alexander / Natali, Carlo / Rapp, Christof / Sedley, David / von Staden, Heinrich / Taub, Liba / Vogt, Katja

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Discourse and Suppression of Discourse in Damascius’ De principiis

Marilena Vlad
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  • Institute for Philosophy “Alexandru Dragomir”, Bd. Mihail Kogalniceanu 49, RO-050104, Bucharest, Romania
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Published Online: 2014-12-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2014-0009


This article discusses the three ways of suppression of discourse proposed by Damascius in his treatise De principiis, namely that the absolute principle must not be subject of conception, supposition, or proclamation. I try to show that this triple suppression aims in the end to surpass the ultimate way in which we can still address the absolute One of the Neoplatonic tradition. It is precisely by surpassing discourse in this way that Damascius imposes his own perspective on the absolute principle, the ineffable.

: Ineffability; discourse; intellect; principle; the One; Damascius

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Published Online: 2014-12-01

Published in Print: 2014-12-01

Citation Information: Rhizomata, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 213–233, ISSN (Online) 2196-5110, ISSN (Print) 2196-5102, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2014-0009.

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