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A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science

Ed. by Bodnár, István / Corcilius, Klaus / Gregoric, Pavel / Ierodiakonou, Katerina

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The Eleatic Challenge in Aristotle’s Physics I.8

Scott O’Connor
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  • Department of Philosophy & Religion, New Jersey City University, 2039 Kennedy Boulevard, Jersey City New Jersey 07305 New Jersey, USA,
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Published Online: 2017-07-18 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002


In Physics I.8, Aristotle outlines and responds to an Eleatic argument against the reality of change. I defend a new reading according to which the argument assumes Predicational Monism, the claim that each being can possess only one property. In Phys. I.2, Aristotle responds to Predicational Monism, which he attributes to the Eleatics; I argue that he uses this response to distinguish coincidental from non-coincidental becoming, a distinction he employs in Phys I.8 to resolve the argument against the reality of change. The Eleatics’ acceptance of Predicational Monism, I argue, explains why this distinction is unavailable to them.

Keywords: Aristotle; change; the Eleatics; Physics; predicational monism


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About the article

Published Online: 2017-07-18

Published in Print: 2017-07-26

Citation Information: Rhizomata, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 25–50, ISSN (Online) 2196-5110, ISSN (Print) 2196-5102, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002.

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