Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
In This Section

Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Engel, Christoph

3 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.22

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.196
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.401

Online
ISSN
1555-5879
See all formats and pricing
In This Section
Volume 1, Issue 1 (Apr 2005)

Issues

Volume 13 (2017)

Legal Durability

Omri Ben-Shahar
  • Law and Economics, University of Michigan
Published Online: 2005-04-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1003

This paper develops a framework to study the effects of the durability of legal allocation decisions, such as trial outcomes, regulatory enactments and property entitlements. For a party favored by the legal allocation, a more durable decision is also more costly to secure, ex-ante. Thus, it is not the greater durability of the allocation that determines whether the “winner” is better-off, but other factors that are affected by the durability attribute, such as the cost of securing a favorable outcome and the ability of contesting parties to affect this cost. The paper develops conditions under which greater durability is irrelevant, or even undesirable to the winner. The analysis is applied to shed light on durability doctrines relating to trial outcomes (e.g., res judicata and double jeopardy), rules and regulations (e.g., transition relief when rules change), entitlements (e.g., adverse possession and statutes of limitations), and marriages.

About the article

Published Online: 2005-04-01



Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1003. Export Citation

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in