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Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Engel, Christoph

3 Issues per year

CiteScore 2016: 0.22

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Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.355

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Volume 10, Issue 3


The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements

Pierre Dehez
  • Corresponding author
  • CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays L1.03.01, Louvain-la-Neuve 1348, Belgium; BETA, University of Lorraine, Nancy, France
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/ Sophie Poukens
Published Online: 2014-09-05 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2013-0016


We consider the problem faced by standard-setting organizations of specifying Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) agreements. Along with Layne-Farrar et al. (2007. “Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments.” 74 Antitrust Law Journal 671–706), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents that have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to these “weak” patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements could look like.

Keywords: patent licensing; Shapley value; core


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About the article

Published Online: 2014-09-05

Published in Print: 2014-11-01

Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 265–284, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, ISSN (Print) 2194-6000, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2013-0016.

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