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Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco / Engel, Christoph

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Franzoni, Luigi

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CiteScore 2017: 0.30

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Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.410

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Volume 13, Issue 3


Recognition of Non-Controlling Interest in Consolidated Financial Statements Based on Property Rights

André Casajus / Helfried Labrenz
  • Institut für Unternehmensrechnung, Finanzierung und Besteuerung, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Leipzig, Grimmaische Str. 12, 04109 Leipzig, Germany
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Published Online: 2017-04-22 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0050


We suggest a recognition of non-controlling interest in consolidated financial statements that takes into account the property rights structure within subsidiary companies, in particular, majority requirements on restructurings, which may differ between countries. Our approach rests on a property rights index based on cooperative game theory. This index captures a parent company’s ability to acquire future gains of the subsidiary.

Keywords: consolidation; majority requirements; property rights; Shapley value

MSC 2010: 91A12; 91B99

JEL Classification: C71; G32; G34; M41; M44


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About the article

Published Online: 2017-04-22

We are grateful to Matthias Herfert, Frank Huettner, Esther Pittroff, and a number of anonymous referees for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support for André Casajus by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant CA 266/4-1) is gratefully acknowledged.

Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 3, 20150050, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0050.

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