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Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco / Engel, Christoph

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Franzoni, Luigi


CiteScore 2017: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.195
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.410

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1555-5879
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Volume 14, Issue 3

Issues

Volume 15 (2019)

Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais / Lars Sørgard
Published Online: 2017-09-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0014

Abstract

This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.

Keywords: merger control; merger remedies; enforcement; deterrence

JEL Classification: K21; L41

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About the article

Published Online: 2017-09-01


Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics, Volume 14, Issue 3, 20150014, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0014.

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